Concerns about Archbishop Ugorji’s Dissertation on Double Effect

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Lucius Iwejuru Ugorji’s 1984 dissertation, The Principle of Double Effect. A Critical Appraisal of Its Traditional Understanding and Its Modern Reinterpretation was written under the supervision of Bruno Schüller (1925–2007) and accepted by the University of Münster. Peter Lang Verlag published it in 1985 as volume 245 in the European University Series on Theology. The author Ugorji, born in 1952, was ordained to the priesthood for the Diocese of Umuahia in 1977 before moving to Germany for doctoral studies in moral theology. Elevated to the episcopacy in 1990, before he was forty years old, Ugorji was the second bishop to lead the young diocese of Umuahia. In 2022, he was installed as archbishop of Owerri and, in the same year, elected president of the Nigerian Bishops’ Conference (Catholic Hierarchy). He has served as the chairman of Caritas Nigeria (“Fleeing”) and as chairman of the governing council of Imo State University (“Ugorji, Ezenna”). The moral theologian published several books after becoming a bishop, including theological monographs and an autobiography in 2000. A Festschrift dedicated to him on his sixtieth birthday (2012) is titled In the Service of Charity and Truth.

The thesis supervisor, Bruno Schüller, was a Jesuit and distinguished professor of moral theology at the University of Münster, where he taught from 1974 to 1991. Before that, he had taught at a number of universities in Germany as well as the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. Several of his publications were translated into English. His 1973 monograph, Die Begründung sittlicher Urteile (Reasoning Moral Judgments), saw its third edition in 1987. Several of his students became full professors at German universities (Hagel).

Ugorji’s dissertation on the double effect grew out of Schüller’s own interests. In the foreword to the thesis, Ugorji thanks his Doktorvater for “inspiring it and for accompanying me at each stage of my research” (9). The dissertation is 150 pages long and divided into five chapters. The first introduces the principle and explains its historical development. Defenders of the principle of double effect argue that certain actions with bad effects are morally justifiable. This doctrine has fascinated moral theologians.

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because of the complicated tie between a good intention (e.g. defeating an aggressive army) and foreseen but unintended bad effects (killing innocent noncombatants in the process). Chapter two describes the acts for which the double effect is applicable. The third chapter goes more deeply into the “direct/indirect” distinction crucial to many instances. The last two chapters are devoted to two modern reinterpretations of double effect among individual German theologians, with chapter four being devoted to a critique of Peter Knauer (born 1935) and chapter five to one of Franz Scholz (1909–1998).

Positive Reception

For a dissertation by an inexperienced international student, Ugorji’s book on the double effect was exceptionally well-received, not only in the English-speaking world, but also among authors publishing in Spanish and German. The monograph was repeatedly endorsed in an enthusiastic manner by the moral theologian James Keenan, now of Boston College. In a 1993 publication, Keenan referenced Ugorji’s dissertation as an example of “exhaustive historical research” (301). In a book chapter published in 2001, he amplified his praise, calling the bishop’s book “the most definitive study” of double effect’s meaning and use (230n25). Keenan’s endorsement of the dissertation seems trustworthy, since the American Jesuit is a respected theologian who lists “Church leadership ethics” among his research interests (Keenan Faculty Profile).

The African theologian Odozor called the book “pioneering” in a presentation at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (20), and an international manual published by the major European distributor De Gruyter cites it as well, making Ugorji standard literature (von der Pfordten 108n25). With such kudos, it is not surprising to find Ugorji cited in many doctoral dissertations, a recent example being Villaseñor Roldán’s. The bishop’s thesis appears there in dozens of footnotes. Ugorji’s dissertation has even been cited in disciplines outside of theology. For this more remote audience, e.g. in Chartier’s 2003 article, the Münster thesis serves as a representative of official Catholic teaching. Chartier cites Ugorji in his attempt to secure a system of ethics for grading academic work fairly (76n49).

Closer examination of the book reveals recurrent patterns of error and confusion in matters of attribution. In many cases, it seems clear that texts in Ugorji’s dissertation were published by other authors, but the texts are presented as Ugorji’s own. To achieve greater clarity about the dissertation’s quality and, consequently, its author’s theological qualifications, seven tables follow. They point to disturbing instances of verbatim or near verbatim text overlap with publications by major theologians who are not properly identified as sources. Several instances call for clarification and, if necessary, correction.

Layers of error in attributing secondary sources

The left column in the following table presents itself as a paraphrase and extraction of a 1949 article by an author identified in the dissertation as “John Mangan.” The column on the right contains text published in a widely-distributed reference work.
John Mangan believes he can trace the application of the principle back to the Old Testament. He instances 1 Maccabees 6 as a striking example where the principle was employed in the justification of self-killing. In this text Eleazar, a Jew, was fighting in the army of the opposing Maccabees against an enemy force. Identifying an elephant on which he believed the king of the opposing side was riding to battle, Eleazar ran under it and slew it, knowing that he himself would be crushed, but hoping that he would thus kill the king or at least disable him. The inspired narrative presents this act as something commendable.

The Old Testament (1 Mc 6) contains a striking example of a lawful application of the principle of the double effect. Eleazar, a Jew, was fighting in the army of the Maccabees against an enemy force. Seeing an elephant on which he believed the king of the opposing side was riding to battle, Eleazar ran under the beast and slew it, knowing that he himself would be crushed, but hoping that he would thus kill or disable the leader of the enemy. This narrative is told in the inspired book as something commendable.

The doctoral candidate misattributed the analysis of First Book of Maccabees to the Jesuit scholar Mangan, whose first name was in fact Joseph, not John. Mangan’s well-known 1949 article receives mention on Ugorji’s page 41 (n13), but with an incorrect page range (41–46 instead of 41–61). Although Mangan did address the Old Testament passage (42), his description of the biblical event is linguistically quite different than Ugorji’s rendering. Ugorji’s phrases are, however, nearly identical to passages from F.J. Connell’s article “Double Effect, Principle of” in the 1967 edition of the New Catholic Encyclopedia. Connell gets no credit for his intellectual property; his name appears nowhere in the dissertation.

The differences between the two columns in table 1 are minimal. Instead of writing “the beast,” Ugorji uses “it.” Instead of Connell’s “seeing,” the later archbishop used “identifying.” For this minimal effort, the dissertation’s author nonetheless implies that he has analyzed several generations’ worth of moral theology, reaching back to an article published in 1949. In fact, Schüller’s advisee seems to have appropriated the text from the readily-available New Catholic Encyclopedia.

Unattributed Sources

When Ugorji sets out to define the term “side-effect” (130–31), he references four different dictionaries. In writing about “scandal,” however, he makes no references to contemporary secondary sources, thus suggesting that he is defining the term in his own words. Indeed, the metaphorical reference to slums in a city as an example of scandal might strike readers as an unusual approach. There are no quotation marks in
this passage, except for one phrase in Latin, so the reader must assume it is an original composition. Yet Table 2 shows how patently this part of the Münster dissertation overlaps with L.G. Miller’s encyclopedia article.

Table 2 The same creative metaphor used by two independent writers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ugorji 58</th>
<th>Miller 1112</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In this sense the word is used to refer not so much to the person or act that causes the shame but to the reaction itself. In this sense a decent citizen might be said to take scandal at the sight of a slum. In the handbooks of moral theology, scandal signifies not so much something shameful and therefore likely to cause a reaction of indignation and outrage, but something that provides occasion and incitement to the sin of another. Most manuals following the footprints of St. Thomas Aquinas (1) define it as “verbum vel factum […]” (2).</td>
<td>In this case the word is used to refer not so much to the person or act that causes the shame, but to the reaction itself. In this sense a decent citizen might be said to take “scandal” at the sight of notorious slums. In moral theology, however, scandal signifies not so much something shameful and therefore likely to cause a reaction of indignation and outrage, but something that provides occasion and incitement to the sin of another.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 cf. S. Th. II-II, q. 43, a. 1.</td>
<td>2 F. Regatillo and M. Zalba […]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are many further passages in Ugorji which are identical to Miller’s article. In one case, a whole sentence with a string of more than twenty identical words appears in the Münster dissertation. To save space, two particularly problematic instances of text overlap in Table 2 will suffice. First, Ugorji provides two footnotes at the end of a section whose content is largely identical to Miller, but the references mention the authors Aquinas, Regatillo, and Zalba. If Ugorji did indeed copy as extensively from Miller as Table 2 suggests, suppressed Miller’s name, and then provided three authors’ names instead of Miller’s, then footnotes 1 and 2 are deceptive. They point the reader away from finding the true source. They may, in fact, be listed in order to distract the reader.

Table 3 shows very significant text overlap between the dissertation and the Australian philosopher Alan Donagan’s 1977 book, *The Theory of Morality*, which Ugorji never cites in footnotes, nor does he include the monograph in his bibliography. Donagan’s book is very well-known, having enjoyed its eighth printing in 1994. When Ugorji submitted his dissertation to Bruno Schüller in Münster, Donagan (1925–1991) had just moved from an endowed professorship at the University of Chicago to one at Caltech (Boyle).
Table 3 Overlap with a prominent Australian philosopher

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ugorji 48–49</th>
<th>Donagan 42–43</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In this regard, two illustrations by Hart and Honoré have become classical examples;</td>
<td>In this connection, two cases in Hart and Honoré's <em>Causation in the Law</em> have become standard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I) “A forest fire breaks out [...].” (6)</td>
<td>(i) A forest fire breaks out [...].¹⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II) “A throws a lighted cigarette [...].” (7)</td>
<td>(ii) A throws a lighted cigarette [...].²⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In both cases, the human performance describable as “the throwing by A of lighted cigarette into the bracken” is one of a set of conditions necessary for the breaking-out of fire. If it had not taken place, the fire would not have broken out. Yet only in the first case can A’s action is throwing the cigarette be correctly described as the cause of the fire. Why?</td>
<td>In both these cases, the event describable as “the throwing by A of a lighted cigarette into the bracken,” is one of a set of conditions jointly sufficient for the fire, and it is not redundant: if it had not occurred, the other conditions specified would not have been sufficient. Yet only in case (i) can A’s action in throwing the cigarette be correctly described as the causing of the fire. Let us see why.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An action, as understood in law, is a deed by a human agent performed in a particular situation or in a set of circumstances. This deed could either consist in an intervention in a natural process (act of doing) or in an abstention from intervention (act of omission). When he intervenes, he can be described as causing whatever would not have occurred had he abstained [...]. The agent is like a “deus ex machina”, whose intervention makes the difference to what otherwise would not naturally have come about.</td>
<td>An action, as conceived by common law, is a deed done in a particular situation or set of circumstances. [...]. His deeds as an agent are either interventions in that natural process or abstentions from intervention. When he intervenes, he can be described as causing whatever would not have occurred had he abstained [...]. [... the agent, <em>qua</em> agent, as external to it. He is like a deus ex machina, whose interventions make a difference to what otherwise would naturally come about without them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⁶ Hart and Honoré, ibid., p. 67. ⁷ Hart and Honoré, ibid., p. 69.</td>
<td>¹⁹ Ibid. [= Hart and Honoré], p. 67. ²⁰ Ibid., p. 69.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The textual comparison in table 3 has been reduced in order to save space; the square brackets that are shaded grey indicate significant amounts of additional overlap. Furthermore, other close textual parallels show how strongly Ugorji relies on Donagan, yet without stating as much. Consider the highlighted parts of the Nigerian student’s claim, which appears in the dissertation a few lines after the text shown above: “Such abnormal occurrence is [...] to put it in the legal parlance a ‘novus actus interveniens.’ This causal influence of the previous action cannot be said to extend to
it.” (49) Donagan’s sentence follows: “Such an action is held to be a novus actus interveniens through which the causal influence of a previous action cannot reach.” (44) The argument and reasoned content of Donagan’s sentence appear as Ugorji’s work, yet the doctoral candidate’s intellectual effort seems limited to replacing a few synonyms like “action” for “occurrence” or “extend” for “reach.”

Evidence in table 4 suggests that the work of a further author, in this case Lisa Sowle Cahill, the J. Donald Monan Professor of Theology at Boston College, entered the body of Ugorji’s work without proper attribution. Cahill has published widely on bioethics, gender, and sexual ethics.

**Table 4 Identical paraphrasing and extraction of a German source**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ugorji 108</th>
<th>Cahill 619</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>He who acts out of a proportionate reason promotes the good sought in a universal sense or absolutely, apart from any reference to the specific persons or community of persons for whom it is concretely enhanced.</td>
<td>[…] but that good is promoted in a universal sense or absolutely (“universal formulierten”), apart from any reference to specific persons or communities of persons for whom it is concretely enhanced [...].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The verbatim or near verbatim similarity between Ugorji and Cahill is all the more remarkable since the object of their analysis is a German text. In order to believe that Ugorji’s writing is original, one would have to accept the coincidence that his English summary of a highly technical German text is largely identical to another English summary published four years before the dissertation.

Another passage in the dissertation suggests pawn sacrifice, as the following table shows.

**Table 5 Verbatim passages from a fifty-year-old dissertation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ugorji 98</th>
<th>Kramer 40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suarez himself places some restriction on the use of the axiom when he says that the “per se” effect must be foreseen before it can be said to be directly willed in its cause. But if, in addition to the efficient agency of the cause, knowledge of the effect is demanded in order that the effect be ascribable to a human agent, why does he not require also that</td>
<td>Suarez himself places some restriction on the use of the axiom, for he says that the natural effect must be foreseen before it can be said to be directly willed in its cause. But if, in addition to the efficient agency of the cause, knowledge of the effect is demanded that the effect may be ascribed to a human agent, why does he not require also that</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the effect be “propter finem”, which is likewise a prerequisite of rational finality? The axiom “Qui vult causam vult effectum”, has its true application and relevance only if the cause is willed as a “causa qua causa”, that is to say, in view of its causal properties, for only then do its effects flow from the will in the manner proper to human acts (80).

– 80. See the Salmanticenses, op. cit., tr. 13, dis. 10, dub. 6, nn. 241-246.

be propter finem, which is likewise a prerequisite of rational finality. The axiom, qui vult causam vult effectum, has its true application only if the cause is willed as a cause, or in view of its causal properties, for only then do its effects flow from the will in the manner proper to human acts;  

20 Salmanticenses, Cursus Theologicus, tr. 13, disp. 10, dub. 6, nn. 241, 246.

Pawn sacrifice is a common device used by plagiarists in order to hide unattributed appropriations of text. Lahusen explained the phenomenon as follows: “The author of record cites a small part as the product of someone else’s intellectual work, in order to make the rest of the text look all the more like his own.” (405)

In Ugorji’s case, the source with overwhelming similarities to his dissertation is another dissertation, published in Washington, DC in 1935 by the Redemptorist priest Herbert Kramer. In Ugorji’s footnote 79, which appears several lines above the text in table 5, there is indeed a passing “cf.” reference to Kramer’s monograph, even if Schüller’s advisee misspells the author’s name as “Krammer.” Using “cf.” suggests that the 1935 book could be of interest, but Ugorji uses no quotation marks to indicate citations, and indeed, using “cf.” indicates clearly that no verbatim citation has taken place. Table 5 suggests otherwise, yet note 80 makes no reference to Kramer at all.

The fact that content from a dissertation submitted fifty years prior was resubmitted nearly verbatim in 1984 gives cause to question whether Ugorji’s thesis made any contribution to the advancement of theological research. In order to give Ugorji academic credit for having written the text in the left column as a result of his own intellectual effort, one would have to believe that not only the verbatim text overlap was coincidental, but that the doctoral student’s footnote 80 was the result of searching and finding relevant sources during prolonged independent research. Ugorji’s grammatical error in the final sentence – “only then does its effects flow” – shows that one of the few variations from the source is in fact an error, not a contribution or an improvement.

The sum total of unattributed text overlap between Ugorji and Kramer is at times staggering and would fill several further tables. Entire paragraphs on pages 96–97 of the Münster dissertation, for instance, are identical to paragraphs on Kramer’s pages 35–37. Arguments and reasoning appear verbatim, as well as copious footnotes. In total, hundreds of words in sequential strings of up to 50 words are identical to the 1935 dissertation.
A passage spanning two pages of the dissertation corresponds in structure, argument, and many phrases to a 1979 article by the Jesuit priest Richard A. McCormick (1922–2000), an American moral theologian. He was a professor at several Catholic universities and “a major figure in the post-Vatican II revision of Catholic moral theologies.” (McCormick Faculty Profile)

Table 6 Replacing “goal” with “objective”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ugorji 133</th>
<th>McCormick 324–25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Innocent persons are present in a fortress attacked by the enemy. [...] He believes that in this case a true side effect is at hand. He, who seeks his objective by an “actio minus recta” does not cause the neighbour’s sin. The operation of another is necessary for a true side-effect. Therefore the psychology of the will does not demand that the evil effect be willed either as a means or as a “conditio sine qua non.”</td>
<td>Innocent persons are present in a fortress attacked by the enemy. [...] In the third case (scandal) we have a true side effect. He who seeks his goal by an actio minus recta does not cause the neighbor’s sin. The operation of another cause is necessary for a true side effect. Therefore, the psychology of the will does not demand that the evil effect be willed either as a means or as a conditio sine qua non.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The only two substantial differences between the two columns is Ugorji’s use of “objective” instead of McCormick’s “goal,” and Ugorji’s omission of “cause.” Neither of these differences constitutes a significant intellectual effort, and the omitted word may well have been deleted in erroneous copying.

Table 7 Reworking other scholars’ arguments to make them appear new

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ugorji 133</th>
<th>McCormick 324–25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A true side-effect is only conceivable, in the case described, if the victims threw themselves at the last moment into the path through which the rider is fleeing. In this case the rider can say he permits what he cannot prevent. With regard to the third example, the attacker might say that he wishes only to kill combatants. But the single natural effect of the bombing is the destruction</td>
<td>We would have a true side effect if, in the case described, the victims threw themselves at the last moment unavoidably into the path of the horse. In that case the rider could say: “I must permit what I cannot prevent.” As for the second case, the attacking general might say that he wishes only to kill combatants. But actually the one natural effect of the bombing is destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of combatants and non-combatants. His regrets at the death of non-combatants
indicates only that their deaths are not intended “propter se sed propter aliud.”
Their death is a “conditio sine non” for the attainment of the good end. But he
who is prepared under the call of the end
to realize the “conditio sine qua non”
acts exactly the same way as the one who
chooses the appropriate means, namely,
he who wills it directly.
Accordingly, in the two last examples
Scholz does not believe that the deaths
of the innocent are indirectly intended.
[...] he thus moves for a new model; “di-
rect, yes, but only for a proportionate
grave reason.”

of soldiers, civilians, beasts. His reg-
ret at the death of innocents means only
that their deaths are not propter se sed
propter aliud. Their deaths are a conditio
sine qua non. But “he who is ready—
under the call of the end—to realize the
condition sine qua non, acts exactly as
the one who chooses the appropriate
means, scil, directly”51 Therefore, in
these first two cases Scholz does not be-
lieve the deaths are indirect. [...] Scholz moves to another model and espouses it: “direct, yes, but only for a
proportionate reason.”

51 Ibid. [= Scholz, “Objekt und Um-
stände, Wesenswirkungen und Neben-
effekte”] 257.

This table compares Ugorji’s chapter 5 about Franz Scholz to a review essay McCormick published with Paulist Press, a major Catholic publisher, in 1979, in the series Readings in Moral Theology. It is not always clear where Ugorji was accessing McCormick’s texts, since the American Jesuit was prolific and developed his scholarly role as a commentator on Catholic moral theology over the course of decades marked by heated controversies. His annual “Notes on Moral Theology” were a regular feature in the journal Theological Studies; he also published compilations of these notes in collections of his own, as well as in collections of theological essays edited by others. The source texts in tables 6 and 7 are, in the end, readily available in several venues published prior to Ugorji’s 1984 dissertation. I reference the Paulist Press version because it was part of a series that gained wide readership over twenty years. The series is available in numerous libraries the world over, and the used book market abounds with its titles. Ugorji may have read McCormick in Theological Studies, since he found both the articles by Mangan (table 1) and Cahill (table 4) in the same journal.

Ugorji makes no mention of McCormick in the chapter devoted to Franz Scholz, although the doctoral candidate’s analysis of Scholz overlaps substantially with the experienced American theologian’s 1979 publication. The evidence in this table appears to fulfill the two factors of text overlap that have led to official retractions of publications and disciplinary repercussions in the past: The overlap is extensive in both quantity and quality (Dougherty 65).

Furthermore, it seems that Ugorji is familiar with McCormick’s system of referencing Scholz, since one of McCormick’s unusual formulations also appears in Ugorji’s book. Normally, it is not necessary to identify a Festschrift in a narrative manner in a footnote, but McCormick writes “This is the Festschrift honoring Joseph Fuchs, S.J.” (104n60) and Ugorji writes “This is the Festschrift in honour of Joseph Fuchs,
S. 3.” (125n1). Instead of the “S.J.” abbreviation for Societas Jesu, Schüller’s advisee writes “S. 3.” This is one of the frequent typographical or bibliographical errors in his dissertation that open up confusing interpretative possibilities. If the reader takes Ugorji seriously as a doctoral student at a German university, the gaffe may well have meant to signify “page three,” since “S.” is a common German abbreviation for “Seite,” especially when followed by a numeral. Nonetheless, page 3 of the Festschrift contains no information relevant to the dissertation, since it is devoted to front matter.

Still more troubling is the fact that all of Ugorji’s fifth chapter, which is devoted to Franz Scholz’ work on double effect, contains not a single reference to secondary sources about the German theologian. While the evidence in table 7 suggests that the doctoral candidate relied rather heavily on secondary sources in some passages, albeit without naming them, unsuspecting readers could well infer that Ugorji was the first to write about Scholz’s work on double effect. Yet Klaus Demmer had written about Scholz extensively in 1977, and Scholz himself published more on the topic in 1981. Ugorji’s 1984 thesis mentions neither of the these two highly relevant German publications. The omission is particularly puzzling since Demmer co-edited the often-mentioned Fuchs Festschrift together with Ugorji’s Doktorvater Schüller. Aside from questions of source attribution, the lack of secondary literature in chapter 5 constitutes sufficient neglect to question the viability of Ugorji’s dissertation.

**High Incidence of Grammatical and Bibliographical Error**

Patchwork plagiarism is a term used to describe a superficial style of writing in which the author composes a purportedly new publication by re-arranging texts found in other people’s publications. A dissertation written in this manner may deliver a certain amount of information, but there is nothing new being presented to the academic community, and texts are rearranged in a manner designed to confuse readers, who are “manipulated into assuming that the author of record is the author of origin.” (Dougherty 7) Very little creative thinking takes place in patchwork plagiarism, since the writer limits his or her composition to “a few introductory or transitional words.” (Cooper 63) While a reader who skims the text may be impressed, careful readers discover patchwork plagiarism by noting jarring contrasts in style or leaps from error to eloquence.

Ugorji’s writing shows some of these characteristics. Grammatical and bibliographical errors occur often, but they stand side-by-side with passages written in fluent scholarly English. Some examples will shed light on the phenomenon, or, to quote Ugorji’s unusual idiom: “An example will help to add more light to this fact.” (65)

- “unable to cope up with a situation like this” (86)
- “A military personal lays violent hands on […]” (86)
- “Regatillo and Zalba asserts” (99)
- “Similarly, catholic moral traditions restricts” (100)
- “plays a moral significant role” (35 and 120)
- “he applies it to a case of the execution of a capital punishment” (120)
- “to side-tract the tragic situations” (128)
Disorienting errors also appear in Ugorji’s bibliography. Susan Nicholson’s 1978 monograph *Abortion and the Roman Catholic Church* is listed inaccurately as a journal article, but without page numbers (146), thus suggesting that Ugorji had not had the book in hand. He listed the “Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary” without a possessive apostrophe (130n14). The double error misspelling of *voluntarium* found in “Suarez, De volunatrium et involunatrium” (93n70) makes the spelling seem intentional. In another footnote, Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* became a “Philosophical Investigation.” (120n26) Pius XII could not have given a speech to Italian blood donors in March of 1959, since he died in 1958. It was John XXIII who held the speech. This slip suggests that Ugorji did not have the source he cited in hand, since it names John correctly. (78n43) On the next page, he has a block quote that begins “Organic transplantation is licit,” but omits the following sentence without alerting readers to the cut: “This thesis is proposed as solidly probable, not certain.” (Kelly 392) Even relatively straightforward citations, like those from Vatican II documents, seem to have challenged the student: While § 69 of *Gaudium et Spes* does include a call to feed a hungry man, “because if you do not feed him you are killing him,” it was not the “Council Fathers” declaring this in the 1960s, as Ugorji claims. They cited it clearly as an “aphorism of the Fathers,” meaning Fathers of the Church, that is, venerable theologians from the Patristic period. (39n11)

Even the list of abbreviations preceding the bibliography is off at points, since some of the abbreviations are never used: RevSR for *Revue des Sciences Religieuses* never appears, although “RecSR” does (146), yet this abbreviation is never explained. There is an unusual entry for the Vatican’s *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, listing volumes “1-74” as having been published “Romae 1909-892.” (150) In a puzzling entry in the ultimate section of the bibliography, a reference to Michael Offiong’s “Unpublished notes on ‘Desacralization of creation’” appears (150). I was unable to find any published works by Offiong or any indication of his work’s academic significance.

Such errors stand in marked contrast to other passages in the book, which are highly eloquent and suggest mastery of academic English. A scholar who has reached the sophistication displayed in much of the book would not likely make mistakes like the ones listed here. All the more reason for concern when Kaczor’s 1998 article uses the Münster dissertation in six cases to reference literature as “cited in Ugorji,” while errors abound in the Nigerian’s bibliography. Consider the entries “Moral Methodology, A. case study” and “Quo sensu secundum 5. Thomam ratio sit regula.” (143) On the same page, he writes “Lonardus” for Leonardus Gaudé, and Martinus Becanus’ 1626 work on faith, hope and charity appears as “De fide Spe et caritate.” Such irregularities – especially amid a list of highly significant works of moral theology – detract from the author’s trustworthiness.

**Questionable Fulfillment of Doctoral Requirements**

The University of Münster’s requirements for granting a doctoral degree in theology were stated clearly in a 1970 document that was in effect during Ugorji’s years there. The policy states that a dissertation must “further theological knowledge” and
“demonstrate the author’s ability to perform research in a scientifically viable manner.” Furthermore, the policy required doctoral students to sign a declaration at the end of their dissertation, stating that they had written the thesis independently and not made use of any works other than those listed in the bibliography (Studienordnung § 2.1).

The evidence presented above provides representative examples of defects that suggest Archbishop Ugorji’s dissertation may not be passable academic work. There are many further problems to be discussed, but the examples analyzed here give ample cause for concern about all three requirements stipulated by the University of Münster. First, the dissertation uses publications about double effect without identifying them properly, therefore re-presenting previously available research as something new. Secondly, the Nigerian doctoral candidate documented his sources in a substantially deficient manner and seems to have used entire paragraphs and arguments from sources without citing them in “a scientifically viable manner.” Thirdly, the seven tables provided above show that passages from publications by several authors appear verbatim in the Münster dissertation, but without giving the authors credit.

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Works cited


Dougherty, M. V. Correcting the Scholarly Record for Research Integrity. Springer, 2018.


Deutsche Zusammenfassung

Bedenken zu Erzbischof Ugorjis Dissertation über das ethische Prinzip der Doppelwirkung


Eine vollständige deutsche Übersetzung dieses Aufsatzes erscheint zeitgleich auf academia.edu und anderen Internet-Plattformen.